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Abstract:
This article argues the political factors behind aid implementation continuously become 
dominant motive in donor-recipient relationships. Thus this makes the effort to effective aid 
which already started since post-Cold War era did not really find significant achievements. 
Although in the Paris meeting aid communities regards the idea of ownership as a new effort 
to effective aid intervention in developing countries, however, once again, the issue of power 
and politics remain hidden in  the  discussion. In fact, ownership has political dimension in 
which it involves power and interest among actors. In this context, each development actor is 
in position to win ‘ownership’ over development according to their agenda. Thus, this makes 
aid effectiveness agenda, once again, did not fully achieve much progress.
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 This article provides critics on the 
international forum on aid effectiveness 
agenda. It especially focuses to discuss on how 
various efforts to improve aid effectiveness did 
not really able to reach significant achievement 
due to dominant    of    political    motives among 
actors involved in the aid relationship – even 
though some commitments and mechanisms 
have already  been  produced.  Secondly, this 
discussion also provides a basis from which 
to critique the principle of country ownership 
as new effort to improve the effectiveness 
of foreign aid. In reality, according to 
political economy perspective  ownership is 
understood as a product of political contests 
and so reflects a continual struggle among 
development actors to serve their own 
interests through ”ownership‟ of development 
agendas (Hutchison, Hout et al. 2014). As a 
consequence, development directions   will    be 
”owned‟ by particular group of people who has 
power and structural opportunities rather than 
reflecting the interest of the whole population. 
Moreover, contestation between the diverse 
groups involved has implications for donors‘ 
ability to achieve their purposes because they 
must contend with local power and resources 
which challenge external development aid 
agendas.
To cover the above arguments, this 
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article is divided into three sections: the first 
section discusses three theoretical approaches 
to aid for development,  and argues  that 
political economy is central to understanding 
donors‟ approaches, local ownershippolitics 
and   development   agendas. The theoretical 
framework is  further developed   in   the 
second   section, which   reviews   evidence 
regarding how the  nature  of political 
relationships among development actors has 
limited efforts to improve aid delivery. After 
reviewing the achievements of the international 
aid effectiveness forums in Section C, the 
fifth section focuses on the Paris Agenda on 
Aid Effectiveness, which identified ownership 
as a key to achieving better outcomes on 
aid delivery. The discussion explores why 
ownership, as a result of political processes, is 
a  problematic  concept that makes it difficult 
to achieve development   targets   because 
each actor is interested in promoting their own 
„ownership‟ of development and sustaining 
their political interests. Finally, the last section 
relates this discussion to lesson-learned from 
aid effectiveness agenda, ownership principle 
and  the  implementation  of aid in Timor-
Leste.
A. Problems of Aid Legitimacy
This section examines political 
economy approaches to critically assessing 
international interventions and local politics. 
Firstly, it presents three different schools of 
thought in the aid and development debate 
and, then, focusses specifically on the 
political economy approach as a powerful 
paradigm through which to examine aid 
implementation, the contest  of  power  
among development actors, and how 
power relationships among these actors 
affect development policies in recipient 
countries.
There is a debate in the literature 
concerning the implications of aid: whether 
it is flawed but potentially useful in 
spurring development in the Global South, 
and  whether  it represents  continuities 
with colonialism or even has the purpose 
of continuing Western domination over 
the countries in the Global South(Kapoor 
2008, Tandon 2008). Regarding this 
debate, scholars can be divided into three 
main groups, each with characteristic 
approaches and strands of thought: the 
mainstream development aid community, 
sceptics and radicals. The first of these, 
which includes Sachs (2005) and Stiglitz 
(2002), argues that aid can contribute to 
the effort to end poverty; but only if steps 
are taken to improve its effectiveness. 
The implementation  of international aid 
meetings, which is discussed in the next 
section, reflects the continuous efforts 
of the development  aid  community  to 
improve the quality of aid delivery.
The international development aid 
communities  understanding  of aid 
and development has critics both from 
neoliberal sceptics and from more radical 
directions. The sceptics argue that aid 
tends to damage developing  countries  by 
empowering the state at the expense of 
the entrepreneurial poor (Easterly, 2013; 
Moyo, 2009). provides the example of aid 
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flows in Africa. In the last several decades, 
Africa has received more than US$ 1 trillion of 
international aid, and there is debate over the 
overall impact of this. Levy (1988),Gomanee, 
Girma et al. (2005), and Morrissey (2005) 
argue that aid has  made  positive  contributions 
to the  development  of  the  continent, but  there 
are  many  studies suggesting the opposite 
(e.g., Goldsmith (2001). In some cases, it 
is argued, aid makes the situation worse by 
fostering corruption, creating dependency, 
and causing social unrest and even civil war 
(Moss, Pettersson et al. 2006, Moyo
2009, Phillips 2013).
Therefore, to solve the problem of aid 
delivery, Easterly and Moyo argue that the 
world’s poor do not need to borrow money 
from the World Bank and IMF – since the 
conditionality has been too soft – nor do  they 
need  to  keep  depending  on Western aid. 
Rather, they suggest an extreme neoliberal 
approach to development as a way to gain 
private capital to finance development which 
is conducted through trade, direct foreign 
investment, capital markets, remittances,  
micro-finance  and savings. This approach 
will impose greater discipline and force state 
agencies to be more efficient (Moyo
2009, Easterly 2013).
The   second   criticism   comes from 
the radicals(Mosse 2005, Duffield 2007, Li 
2007). This group believes relationships 
between countries in the Global North 
and Global South are exploitative rather 
than cooperative. According to this radical 
perspective, aid projects are part of neoliberal 
agendas that aim to facilitate capital flows 
to developing countries in the interests of 
exploiting Southern resources largely  for  the 
benefit  of corporations based in the Global 
North. To successfully achieve these agenda, 
the West uses practices of domination that 
have been variously analysed according to 
two main approaches: the Foucauldian and 
the political economy perspectives.
The  Foucauldian  supporters argue aid 
is the practice of liberal governmentality, and 
constitutes a technique to make countries 
in the Global   South   accept   the   West’s 
reform agendas as their own agenda(Anders 
2005, Duffield 2007, Li 2007). As its name 
implies, this perspective uses the work of 
Michael Foucault on governmentality which 
defines as “the conduct of conduct” (Lemke  
2002), meaning an effort to shape, guide or 
affect the conduct of a particular community 
by using a set of practices and calculated 
strategies. This can be done through several 
ways, including educating the people and 
configuring their  habits and beliefs so that  
they will comply with the desired agenda of 
development (McKee 2009).
In her book, The Will to Improve: 
Governmentality,  Development,  and the 
Practice of Politics (2007), Li provides an 
example of governmentality programmes 
carried out by donors through implementation 
of integrated conservation and development 
projects in villages around Lore Lindu 
National Park in Indonesia (Li 2007).1 
1  ccpolitical   processes   often   means that 
donors‟ governmentality projects are only 
partially able to reach their neoliberal 
targets.
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Under the programme, these agencies  
identified  some  key problems that cause 
poverty and injustice and then proposed 
„expert‟ technical interventions as a way to 
address it without an understanding of local 
political context. However, since the project 
used the intervener‟s prescription  rather  
than  being  based on  local  problems  and  so  
failed  to bring development benefits to the 
population excluded from the Park, it created 
a critical community; the highlanders became 
radicalized and wary of interventions that 
failed to deliver promised improvements.
Thus, Foucault’s understanding of 
governmentality provides insight into how 
donor practices ultimately serve donor 
interests in line with a neoliberal agenda, by 
defining the problem and proposing solutions 
based on „superior‟ knowhow. However, it 
falls short of understanding  local  political 
practices and how development becomes the 
site of contestation between  a  variety  of 
international and local development actors. 
The absence of understanding of these
Therefore, this article argues, 
understanding of donor intervention 
can better explain through structuralist 
political economy position, which draws 
upon Gramscian state theory, especially as 
developed by Poulantzas (1978) and Jessop 
(2008), which views development as a site 
of contestation between competing groups 
(with different power, resources and political 
opportunity structures) that have different 
interests and who engage in struggle over 
distributions of resources and the ideologies 
that legitimise these – development outcomes 
thus  reflect the  result of this contestation 
(Hughes and Hutchison 2012, Hutchison, 
Hout et al. 2014, Hout 2015, Hameiri, Hughes 
et al. 2017). From this perspective, aid flows 
are not simply a matter of improving standards 
of living. Along with the distribution of 
resources, they constitute never- ending 
social and political contestations (developed 
from historical  political  economy processes 
and continually changing) between different 
groups which compete  over  control  of 
development resources producing structurally 
unequal societies where power and wealth 
are unevenly allocated  (Hutchison,  Hout  
et  al. 2014, Hameiri, Hughes et al. 2017). In 
this view, aid programming is an intervention 
in this process in which it encourages local 
actors to struggle to influence the new form 
of governance which tries to build its power  
base  through  aid programmes. The final 
policies then reflect  the  balance  of  power 
between  these  development  actors. It is 
this approach that underpins the theoretical 
understanding of power used in this article.
B. The    Aid    Effectiveness Agenda and 
the Politics of Aid Delivery
The previous section explained that 
a realistic understanding of the complex 
nature of politics in aid delivery is important 
to increase the effectiveness of international 
interventions. In this section, the framework 
developed above is used to evaluate the efforts 
of the aid community  to  improve  the  quality 
of aid delivery through international forums 
on aid effectiveness. These aimed   to   meet 
the   demands of donors and recipient countries 
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while producing some key agreements on aid 
implementation. This discussion seeks to show 
that these agreements did not really achieve 
their targets since they continuously failed to 
address political factors behind aid operations.
The concept of aid effectiveness has 
been negotiated and developed in international 
forums since the 1990s. It   particularly 
emerges   as   critics began to point out that 
aid projects are often wasteful and inefficient 
in implementation. For this, those in the aid 
community camp argue, some strategies  should 
be  applied  so  that aid  delivery  quality  could 
be improved  (Sachs 2005) and (Stiglitz 2002). 
Thus, in order to meet the challenge  presented 
by  the  sceptics, the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), an international committee 
with a mandate to discuss aid programmes and 
policies in developing countries on behalf of 
the Organisation for Economic Co- operation 
and Development  (OECD) decided  to 
promote  an aid effectiveness  agenda  which 
was largely focused on increasing the quality 
of aid delivery in developing countries. To 
do this, it decided to facilitate international 
meetings bringing together donors and their 
partners.  These  forums  are  regarded as 
important since they addressed aid actors’ 
differences  and  efforts  and aims to produce 
specific policies  for  the  full  effectiveness of 
international aid in the future.
The  first  of  the  aid effectiveness forums 
held on 21-22 March 2002 in Monterrey, 
Mexico, was the Conference on Financing for 
Development and was attended by more than 
50 Heads of State and Government. This was 
a response to the financial crises of the 1990s 
in Latin America and Asia, which slowed 
down and undermined the sustainability of 
development programmes  and  so  contributed 
to the  increase in poverty  in affected 
countries – a situation that made it difficult 
to achieve (Millennium Development Goals) 
MDGs targets. As a result, at the Monterrey 
conference, donors committed to allocated 
0.7 percent of their Gross National Income to 
support poor countries to reduce poverty and 
achieve the targets of the MDGs.
Despite these commitments, according 
to a UN evaluation, while there have been 
some successes across the globe after the 
implementation  of  the  MDG agendas, 
aid interventions still failed to significantly 
improve living conditions  (UN  2015)  .  This 
has been demonstrated to be specifically due 
to MDGs having been used as a tool of global 
power to serve donor interests rather than truly 
focusing on eradicating poverty in developing 
countries (Amin 2006, Bond 2006). As a result, 
the dominant political motives that lay behind 
the implementation of development  agendas 
meant  that the efforts towards fulfilling the 
MDGs had limited success.
To reaffirm the commitment to 
improving aid effectiveness, a High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness was held in 
Rome 2003. It was attended by leaders from 
the major multilateral banks, bilateral and 
international  organizations  and donor and 
recipient country representatives. The result 
of the forum was the Rome Declaration on 
Harmonization. The Declaration emphasizes 
the commitment to enhance the quality of 
aid delivery by strengthening the principles 
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of harmonization. In Rome, the delegation 
committed “to harmonize the operational 
policies, procedures, and practices of our 
institutions with those of partner country 
systems to improve the effectiveness of 
development    assistance”    (OECD 2003). 
This approach has had to be adapted since 
it has proved ineffective because most 
of the international efforts in developing 
countries have become fragmented rather 
than harmonised (Annen and Moers 2012, 
OECD 2012, Phillips 2013). As a result, new 
aid modalities were introduced in the form of 
budget support and the Sector Wide Approach 
(SWAp), replacing  traditional  project funding 
and aiming to reduce transaction costs (e.g., 
limiting the number of individual projects) 
and enhance  local  leadership (Andersen and 
Therkildsen 2007).
Budget support and SWAp became 
popular   as   a   new   part• nership-based 
approach  to  enhance the quality of aid and 
support sectors of development. However, the 
facts show   that   donor   countries   often pursue 
their self-interests through budget  support 
and  SWAp mechanisms (Canadian Council 
for International Co-operation 2005, Riddell 
2007,   Dann   and   Hammel 2013,  Swedlund 
2013,  Cheng  and Chan 2015, International 
Fund for Agricultural  Development  2015). 
Thus,  aid  programmes  largely continue to 
serve the goals and objectives of donors rather 
than local priorities. Meanwhile, in recipient 
countries,  interest  groups  with political 
motives struggle to influence implementation 
of the two methods (Andersen   and   Therkildsen 
2007, Cruz and McPake 2011, Tilley 2014). 
These conditions suggest that the problem of 
improving the aid quality was never primarily 
a technical one but was basically political in 
nature.
The Paris High-Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness,   held   in   March 2005, aimed 
to strengthen commitments  to improve 
the quality of aid which had been made in 
Monterrey   and   Rome.   The   forum itself was 
regarded as a breakthrough in international 
development since it involved a wide range 
of voices (35 donor countries, 26 multilateral 
donor organisations,    56    developing countries 
and 14 civil society observers) (see Mawdsley, 
Savage et al. 2014). The forum resulted in 
the Paris  Declaration  on  Aid Effectiveness 
which  focused on  two elements: First, donor 
countries were encouraged to give greater local 
ownership in aid implementation. Second, 
donors and partner countries committed to be 
more transparent in the aid efforts aiming to 
create mutual accountability at international 
and country  level  (Wood,  Betts  et  al. 
2011).
According to some evaluations, there 
has been poor progress on achieving the 
Paris commitment targets for improving the 
quality of aid delivery in many aid partner 
countries. Arguably, this is because power 
and interests still dominate relationships 
among donors and local leaders(Mahmud 
2008, World Bank 2008, Roberts 2009, 
Chandy 2011, Sjöstedt 2013, Brown 2016). 
Even when national governments were   able   
to   establish   strategic plans, the decision to 
do so was decided unilaterally by a particular 
group of   people,   including  local elites 
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and donor agents, as a way to sustain their 
own development agendas, at the expense of 
public priorities (Brown 2016).
The third High Level Forum on the aid 
effectiveness agenda took place in Accra, 
Ghana in September 2008 and was attended 
by 1,200 delegations from 100 countries and 
intergovernmental   organisations. The focus 
of the meeting was to evaluate, strengthen 
and deepen the Paris Declaration principles 
and commitments. This meeting took place at 
a time when the global context was changing 
significantly – in the same month that the 
Global Financial Crisis reached  its height. 
Some worried that this situation might 
cause a drop in the amount of Western aid 
to developing countries. Meanwhile, at the 
same time the world economy was entering 
a commodities  boom  resulting  from the 
huge increase in the power of China and the 
massive competition for primary commodities 
that this engendered. Strengthening South-
South Cooperation (SSC)2  in the development 
2  SSC refers to an alternative form of 
development cooperation in the context 
of middle income countries. In fact, the 
idea is not new - it was first introduced 
through a meeting called the Asian–
African Conference which was held in 
Bandung 1955 (also known as the Bandung 
Conference). The Bandung conference 
met representatives from 29 independent 
nations and resulted in the creation of the 
Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). NAM 
aimed to work against the domination of 
the West  (United  States  and  its  allies) 
and the East (the Soviet Union and other   
communist   states)   and   to create and 
support SSC. At  Accra, the idea of SSC 
was harnessed to the goal of greater aid 
effectiveness.
agenda  became  one of the  most highlighted 
points at the forum.
SSC has been regarded by some 
as  an  alternative  option  in international   
cooperation   that   can fulfil recipient 
countries development needs. However, the 
matter is not altogether   simple.  In  political 
economy terms, the idea of „South- South‟ 
is a rhetorical device designed to invoke 
ideas of equality and solidarity, arising from 
a common colonial  experience.  However, 
analysis  of  the  relationship  between the 
BRICS3  powers and the countries to which 
they have given development assistance shows 
that the promise of equality is misleading. For 
example, Michael Sata, the fifth President of 
Zambia, likened Chinese aid and investments 
to Trojan horses, exploiting local resources 
without contributing significantly to the 
development of African economies or society 
(Brautigam 2009). Thus, SSC still involves 
politics and interests rather than mutual 
cooperation.
Three   years   after   Accra,   in2011, the 
fourth High Level Forum, entitled Partnership 
on Development Cooperation, was held in 
Busan, South Korea. It was initiated by the 
G7+, a group of twenty fragile and conflict-
affected states attempting to reshape the 
terms by which aid operators work. The result 
of the meeting was called a New Deal for 
Engagement  in  Fragile  States (OECD 2012). 
The principles in the New Deal agreement 
showed the wish for better achievement of aid 
3  These are Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa.
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efforts in the future particularly after “lessons-
learned” in the previous implementation  of 
aid  which  still did  not  make  beneficial 
contributions to recipient countries (Da Costa 
2012). In the meantime, the emergence of 
the G7+ and the New Deal also reflects new 
power dynamics between donors
and  recipients  in  a  changing  aid landscape.
The Busan New Deal agreement also 
demonstrated another struggle for influence 
by local actors over the direction of social, 
economic and political development in aid 
recipient countries. This is reflected in the 
principle  of  ownership  which  states that   
“partnerships   for   development can only 
succeed  if they are led by developing 
countries, implementing approaches  that  are  
tailored  to country-specific situations and 
needs” (OECD 2011, p.3). It was expected, 
by using local actor priorities, the full interests 
of many elites in the country can be easily 
achieved. This was, in part, because it was 
assumed that the involvement of civil societies 
in development   can   ensure   that   aid efforts   
work   in   the   interests   of citizens. However, 
they have to face donors  and  elites  who  are  
powerful and have interests in influencing 
development policy (Beausang 2012, Hughes,  
Hooley  et  al.  2014, Paffenholz 2015). For 
instance, the New Deal process in Mogadishu 
was dominated by elites and international 
actors (Paffenholz 2015). Also, implementing  
the  principles  of country   ownership   and   
alignment does  not  mean  the  end  of  donor 
power. Donors are still able to retain their 
power through capacity building, training, 
technical assistance, reform etc.
From  the  above  discussion,  it can 
be seen that aid can indeed be politically 
profitable to certain stakeholders. Both donors 
and local leaders have their own interests 
in the aid flow. On the donor side, aid can 
be used as a tool for achieving their reform 
agenda. Therefore, to ensure the maximum 
gain of their reform targets they may use 
various methods including privileging their 
own aid system standards and trespassing 
on local institutions‟ systems  (Bergamaschi 
2009,  Paul 2013, Hudson 2015) . Meanwhile 
from the recipients‟ perspective, aid inflows 
are also a source of power. Rather   than   using 
aid   for   the purpose of improving the living 
conditions of the poor, power- holders tend 
to be more interested in implementing the 
aid effectively for their    private    interests 
(Dietrich 2011).
Looking at the above facts, it is 
understandable why many authors argue 
that the problem of power and interests has 
meant that the principles produced by various 
international forums on aid effectiveness 
have led to the achievement of relatively few 
of their agreed goals (Chuhan and Bhargava 
2006,  Brown  and  Morton 2008, Wallace 
2009, Chandy 2011, Dabelstein and Patton 
2013, Paffenholz 2015). This understanding 
was expressed by Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary 
General (2007-2016): “all too often, aid 
is driven  more  by  politics  than  by need, 
undermining its effectiveness” (quoted in 
Herfkens & Bains, 2015, p.57). This has meant 
that efforts to allocate resources to those who 
need it most have been continually unable to 
achieve this. The above evidence also clearly 
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suggests that although it is relatively easy 
for aid actors to produce agreements, there 
are other factors beyond aid that prevent 
them from following the agreed principles 
and which they continually failed to address, 
namely, political interests (see also Carothers 
and De Gramont 2013).
C.   The Paris Declaration and the 
Politics of Ownership
The idea of ownership that was introduced 
in the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness has 
been widely regarded within the development 
aid community as a key ingredient for 
successful international aid programmes. 
Here, however, this belief is critiqued on the 
grounds that it is too confident in assuming 
that political leaders in recipient countries 
are committed  to  national development and 
that it ignores the fact that public policies are 
complex processes involving various interests 
from different actors. Different access to 
power and opportunities among these actors 
means that development ownership belongs to 
a particular group of people, not the rest of 
population.
As   presented   in   the   section above, 
the idea of country ownership became a key 
ingredient to improving the  quality of  aid 
delivery  and  was firstly introduced in the Paris 
Declaration  on  Aid  Effectiveness  in 2005. It 
encouraged both donor and recipient countries 
to play their roles in development practices 
by ensuring local ownership to increase the 
performance of aid implementation. This means 
donors were requested to reduce their domination 
and let the leaders in Southern countries „drive‟ 
development  processes  according  to the 
principle of ownership, as stated in the Paris 
Declaration:
Partner countries commit to:
(1) Exercise leadership in developing and 
implementing their national development 
strategies through broad consultative processes; 
(2) Translate these national development 
strategies into prioritised results-oriented 
operational programmes as expressed in 
medium-term expenditure frameworks and 
annual budgets; (3) Take the lead in co-
ordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with 
other development resources in dialogue with 
donors and encouraging the participation of 
civil society and the private sector. Meanwhile 
donors commit to: Respect partner country 
leadership and help strengthen their capacity to 
exercise it (DAC 2008).
According to the point above, recipient 
leadership has to have greater authority to lead 
in putting sound systems and policies in place. In 
reality, donor agencies still had dominant roles 
in preparing such reforms, making it difficult 
for the local government to take ownership of 
aid activities. For instance, to strengthen the 
implementation of particular  policy  donors  
may provide the lacking capacity. And technical 
assistance and capacity- building programmes 
are indeed powerful ways of inculcating 
certain attitudes and understanding of what 
development is and how it ought to be achieved; 
so, to achieve the development targets, donors 
determine which kind of capacity building is 
needed by recipient countries. This weakens 
local leadership and undermines genuine policy 
learning, at the same time as increasing donor 
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power. Some individuals might be able to 
disagree with donors‟ preferences but this would 
cause the “delay the arrival of the much-needed 
resources” (Rakner, van de Walle, & Mulaisho,  
2001:  p.587).  Thus, the situation was not nearly 
as simple as the Declaration assumed.
A few years after they were agreed, the Paris 
Declaration‟s objectives regarding ownership 
have made some progress, even though there 
are  still  serious  problems  in practice.  As  de 
Renzio,  Whitfield, different actors (within the 
stateand between the state and other agents, 
within and between donor and civil society 
organizations, within and between different 
social, gender and age groups in society) and 
contested interests. Ownership reflects the 
continuing   contest   of   power   in which 
all parties who have different viewpoints   and 
power   resources seek to influence decisions 
and outcomes (Castel-Branco 2008, Mahmud 
2008.  While  ownership-and Bergamaschi 
(2008) seeking strategies may vary between 
investigation   found  in   many agents, different 
power and out African countries donors 
were still dominated  decision-making  and 
their projects were also fragmented, making it 
difficult for local government to coordinate aid 
according to their national development plan. 
These  practices, then, have undermined policy 
ownership on the side of African leaders.
So, why has the principle of ownership 
not  had  significant success in  achieving 
its goals?  An answer to this question can be 
found in the political aspect of ownership, as 
suggested by the above criticisms of the Paris 
Declaration‟s assumptions, rather than in the 
abstract definition of the term. Aid relationships 
involve power and power relations between 
structural positions among them will make 
development policies and directions reflect the 
power struggle among powerful actors rather 
than reflecting democratic solutions.
Some argue that the practice of respecting 
and supporting recipient governments‟ 
greater ownership in economic policy, 
governance, and social welfare systems is 
a way to transfer responsibility to recipient 
leadership on the aid coordination efforts. In 
fact, as mentioned in the Paris Declaration 
(2005), donors were required to be “more 
harmonised, transparent and collectively 
effective [in their aid activities]” (DAC, 
2008: p.6). However, this has not really been 
fulfilled  (see  Harrison  and  Mulley 2009), 
which suggests that donors‟ power and 
interests are still dominant in aid delivery 
practices. In addition, by using the ownership 
agenda, donors can also gain legitimation 
to distance themselves from the process 
and outcomes of  aid-supported  reforms 
(Fraser and Whitfield 2009). Thus, they can 
avoid taking responsibility for unsuccessful 
programme implementation by blaming the 
recipient domestic conditions, thus, enabling   
them   to   „save   face‟   – while, if the 
development is successful, donors can claim 
that it because of their support.
Another author asserts that the transfer to 
local ownership  can be understood as donors‟ 
shorthand for making recipient governments 
increase their development budget and thus 
reduce aid flows (Helleiner 2002). But this 
does not mean that the donor‟s influence 
over development becomes weaker. As noted 
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earlier, development agencies still  retain 
a  great  deal  of  control over development 
because they have many features of power 
(like knowledge, ideas and politics) to achieve 
their  development  targets. In the case of 
Peru, for instance, although, to some extent, 
leadership of the country had control over 
resource allocation (including aid resources 
from donors), donors still used a „doctor knows 
best‟ approach (based on their technical 
expertise) to improve the functioning and 
quality of the healthcare system to “better‟ 
address  the  needs  of Peruvian citizens. 
Consequently, donor agencies and their 
foreign implementing agents  took  a  major 
role in fund management and programme 
implementation with limited  ownership  on 
the  part  of local leaders (Buffardi 2013).
In Rwanda and Tanzania, donors provide 
small amounts  of money in budget support 
so that they can obtain a seat at the „policy 
dialogue‟ table. This then allows them to 
meet  with key groups and determine which 
are the  key  reforms  and  policies (Swedlund 
2013). However, donors‟ reform agendas are 
not always easy to achieve because of the 
„powers‟ in the local context that are also 
interested in influencing development design, 
and able to challenge donors‟ domination. As a 
consequence, local actors will always     have 
a    share    of    the “ownership‟, regardless 
of the level of the group. Once again, it can 
be seen that the commitment to ownership 
expressed in the Paris High Level Forum 
was  only good  in  theory. In practice, as 
Bräutigam argues, ownership   denotes   “the 
extent   to which there is a coincidence of 
interest and ideas between aid agencies  and 
the  political leadership   regarding   the   design 
and implementation of certain programs and 
policies favoured by the aid agencies” (2000: 
p. 32).
D.  Conclusion
This article discussed the political 
economy  framework  used to understand 
relationships among actors in improving aid 
delivery though aid effectiveness agenda 
and implementing ownership principle. The 
discussion highlighted that the political 
interests of relevant actors need to be 
considered central to understanding donor-
recipient relationships in aid delivery. Both 
donors and local elites view aid resources 
as important tools for achieving   their 
interests:   on   the donor side, aid can be 
used as a technology to change attitudes 
of people in developing countries so they 
conform to neoliberal ideals. Meanwhile, for 
local elites, aid flow is a source of power for 
supporting political interests. However, the 
nature  of  political  process  in  the local 
country also affects relationships among 
actors and thus also shapes outcomes of aid 
programme implementation. This means 
that development policies are shared among 
particular groups of development actors 
(donors, elites and non-elite groups) with 
different interests and power resources. 
This, in turn,  makes   aid   effectiveness 
effort does not reach significant outcomes 
while also makes national ownership agenda 
(as promoted by the Paris Declaration on 
improving aid delivery) impossible to achieve 
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because it is contested and so privileges the 
more powerful groups in the community.
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